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Chief Justice McLachlin and the
Division of Powers
Mahmud Jamal

I. INTRODUCTION
These brief remarks offer a few reflections on Chief Justice McLachlin’s
contributions to the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on the
division of powers, based on cases where she authored or co-authored
reasons for judgment.1 It is obviously daunting to try to comment on the


Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, Toronto. I would like to thank Jennifer Horton, an Osler
articling student, for her excellent research assistance and for reviewing an earlier draft of these
remarks.
1
MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] S.C.J. No. 99, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796, at 834-35 (S.C.C.)
(province can inquire into wrongful conviction — here, of Donald Marshall, Jr. — as part of
administration of justice within the province); Westcoast Energy v. Canada (National Energy
Board), [1998] S.C.J. No. 27, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322, at paras. 108-168 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Westcoast”], dissenting (whether gas processing plants and related gathering facilities form part of
a single interprovincial gas transportation undertaking); Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002]
S.C.J. No. 21, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward”] (federal regulations prohibiting the
sale of young hooded and harp seals supportable under federal fisheries power but not under the
criminal law power); R. v. Morris, [2006] S.C.J. No. 59, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915, at paras. 82-139
(S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., dissenting (whether valid provincial law prohibiting hunting
at night with an illuminating device impinges upon Aboriginal treaty right to hunt); Reference re
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act”] (federal regulations relating to assisted human
reproduction upheld as criminal law); NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C.
Government Service Employees’ Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696, at paras. 48-81
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society”], McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J.,
concurring with the majority in the result (provincial labour relations law applies to First Nations
child welfare agency); Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child
and Family Services of Toronto, [2010] S.C.J. No. 46, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 737, at para. 13 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada”], McLachlin C.J.C. and
Fish J., concurring in the result) (provincial labour relations law applies to First Nations child
welfare agency); Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lacombe”] (municipal zoning by-law prohibiting the construction of
aerodromes on a lake ultra vires); Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots
Association, [2010] S.C.J. No. 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “COPA”] (provincial
legislation limiting non-agricultural land uses constitutionally inapplicable to prohibit aerodromes in
agricultural zones); Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J.
No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, at paras. 45-73 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS Community Services
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jurisprudence of the longest-serving Chief Justice in Canadian history.
But the task certainly repays the effort and only deepens one’s admiration
for her many important contributions to Canadian law. In that spirit,
these notes provide a few comments on Chief Justice McLachlin’s
judicial philosophy and her contributions to legal federalism and legal
education. I will argue that Chief Justice McLachlin’s federalism
jurisprudence fairly reflects her self-described judicial philosophy as
being scrupulously non-partisan and impartial. I will further suggest that
her contributions to the doctrines of legal federalism, as seen in her
interjurisdictional immunity rulings by way of example, brought greater
stability, certainty, and clarity to the law. I will close by suggesting that
the rigour and lucidity of her judicial writing have contributed
significantly to legal education in Canada.

II. JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
One might begin by asking what Chief Justice McLachlin’s division
of powers rulings reveal about her philosophy of the proper balance
between the federal and provincial legislative powers. If, as Professor
Wayne MacKay has observed, “[t]he Court’s federalism jurisprudence
over the past 125 years [has been] marked by huge pendulum swings,
sometimes favouring the federal government and other times favouring
the provinces”,2 then surely it is fair to ask where Chief Justice
McLachlin sat on the federalism spectrum. Did she tend to favour federal
or provincial power?
The question might be rejected out of hand as being antithetical to the
judicial role. The Chief Justice herself described that role in traditional
terms, as being an “independent arbiter”, one who must determine “what
falls to the federal government under section 91 and what falls to the
Society” or “Insite”] (federal criminal law constitutionally applicable to provincial safe injection
site); Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14, [2013] 1
S.C.R. 623, at paras. 129-132 (S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C. and Karakatsanis J. (declining to consider
as moot whether Manitoba statutes related to the implementation of the Manitoba Act were ultra
vires); Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, at paras.
128-152 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”] (s. 35 framework displaces interjurisdictional immunity
in evaluating provincial encroachments on land held under Aboriginal title); and Grassy Narrows
First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), [2014] S.C.J. No. 48, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 447, at para. 53
(S.C.C.) (interjurisdictional immunity does not preclude a province from justifiably infringing
Aboriginal treaty rights).
2
A. Wayne MacKay, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Federalism: Does\Should
Anyone Care Anymore?” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 241, at 253.
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provinces under section 92” of the Constitution Act, 1867.3 Such a
determination must be made, she noted, “fairly and impartially in a
nonpartisan fashion; on the basis of the law, the materials and the
pleadings before [the court].”4 Not surprisingly, the Chief Justice
emphasized that, “[u]nlike politicians, judges do not have agendas. They
take the law and the cases as they find them and apply their interpretive
skills to them as the constitution requires.” This, she added, “is a legal
task; indeed, it is judging of the highest level.”5 Thus, as a judge, Chief
Justice McLachlin says that she has tried “not to think about things in too
strategic a manner” — her job has been “simply to listen to what the
parties have to say, and to do my best to understand the position, the
ramifications of deciding one way or the other, to think about what’s best
for Canadian society on this particular problem that’s before us ….”6
But if the question of where Chief Justice McLachlin sat on the
federalism spectrum may be asked, what do her decisions show? Did
they tend to favour federal or provincial power? On examination, her
decisions reveal no consistent pattern — except, perhaps, to confirm her
self-described approach to judging: deciding one case at a time, without a
larger agenda or strategy. To quote Joseph Brean, writing in the National
Post, “for every grasp at an ideological decryption of her work, a
counter-example announces itself”.7 Thus, McLachlin C.J.C.’s decisions
include rulings:
 that took an expansive view of the federal criminal law power, to
support regulations for assisted human reproduction,8 but that also
adopted a much narrower view of the same power, to not support
regulations prohibiting the sale of baby seals;9

3
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1867”]. Chief Justice Beverley
McLachlin, “The judiciary’s distinctive role in our constitutional democracy” Policy Options
(September 1, 2003), online: <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/canadian-universities/thejudiciarys-distinctive-role-in-our-constitutional-democracy/>.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Joseph Brean, “‘Conscious objectivity’: That’s how the chief justice defines the top court’s
role. Harper might beg to differ” National Post (May 23, 2015), online: <http://nationalpost.
com/news/conscious-objectivity-thats-how-the-chief-justice-defines-the-top-courts-role-harper-mightbeg-to-differ>.
7
Id.
8
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, supra, note 1.
9
Ward, supra, note 1.
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 that permitted provinces to regulate what was claimed to be a single
integrated federal transportation undertaking,10 but that also resisted
a municipality’s attempt to do so, in declaring ultra vires a municipal
prohibition of aerial transportation facilities within the municipality;11
and
 that applied the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, in holding that
a province could not regulate the location of aerodromes within the
province,12 but also refused to apply that doctrine, in holding that
provincial labour relations law applied to a First Nations child
welfare agency,13 and in finding federal criminal law applied to a
health care facility.14
Similar examples abound. In this realm, as in so many others, Chief
Justice McLachlin’s decisions resist being pigeonholed. Instead, they
fairly reflect her self-described judicial philosophy as being scrupulously
non-partisan and impartial, deciding one case at a time.

III. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DOCTRINES OF LEGAL FEDERALISM
What, then, might be said of the Chief Justice’s substantive
contributions to the jurisprudence? In his insightful analysis of the first
decade of the McLachlin Court’s contributions to federalism, Professor
Peter Oliver observed that the last quarter-century or so has seen a
“stabilization in the interpretation of the federal heads of powers” —
leading him to ask, somewhat provocatively, whether “legal federalism is
the constitutional equivalent of medieval history, in which new
discoveries and new developments are few and far between?”15 In
Professor Oliver’s view, “despite the relative stability in the interpretation
10

Westcoast, supra, note 1, at paras. 108-168, dissenting.
Lacombe, supra, note 1 (municipal zoning by-law prohibiting the construction of
aerodromes on a lake within the municipality ultra vires).
12
COPA, supra, note 1 (provincial legislation limiting non-agricultural land uses
constitutionally inapplicable to prohibit aerodromes in agricultural zones).
13
NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society, supra, note 1, at paras. 48-81, McLachlin
C.J.C. and Fish J., concurring with the majority in the result; Communications, Energy and
Paperworkers Union of Canada, supra, note 1, at para. 13, McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., concurring
in the result.
14
PHS Community Services Society, supra, note 1, at paras. 45-73.
15
Peter C. Oliver, “The Busy Harbours of Canadian Federalism: The Division of Powers
and Its Doctrines in the McLachlin Court” in David A. Wright & Adam M. Dodek, eds., Public Law
at the McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011), 167-200, at 169.
11
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of the division of power, there is a still a good deal of important activity
in the field of legal federalism”, in revisions, clarifications, and
refinements of the various doctrines of legal federalism. These include
the pith and substance analysis, as well as the doctrines of double aspect,
ancillary powers, paramountcy, and interjurisdictional immunity — all of
which are aimed at “the encouragement of cooperative federalism”, in
which “legislation is generally upheld and disputes allocated to the
intergovernmental process”.16
While Chief Justice McLachlin made many important contributions to
the doctrines of legal federalism, I’d like to address, by way of example,
three relating to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity — the
doctrine under which a valid law of general application enacted by one
level of government is “read down” as constitutionally inapplicable
where it “impairs” the protected core of jurisdiction of the other level of
government. They are: first, the proper test for “impairment” under
interjurisdictional immunity; second, the recognition that interjurisdictional
immunity is “reciprocal”, in that not just the federal government but also
the provinces can claim immunity from the laws of the other level of
government; and lastly, the relationship between interjurisdictional
immunity and Aboriginal rights protected under section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982.
Shortly after the Court’s decision in Canadian Western Bank,17 the
Chief Justice clarified the proper test for impairment. As is well known,
in 2007 the Court in Canadian Western Bank elevated the test for
interjurisdictional immunity from a relatively low threshold of merely
“affecting” a protected “core” of the jurisdiction of the other level of
government, to one that insisted upon a higher standard of “impairment”.
But there remained uncertainty as to how impairment was to be
established. That issue came before the Court just three years later, in
Lacombe and COPA, where the Court had to decide whether a provincial
16
Id., at 169, 199. See also P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp.
(Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2007), at 5-46 [hereinafter “Hogg”], cited in Quebec
(Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693, at
para. 17 (S.C.C.), referring to cooperative federalism as a “descriptive concept” that describes the
“network of relationships between the executives of the central and regional governments [through
which] mechanisms are developed, especially fiscal mechanisms, which allow a continuous
redistribution of powers and resources without recourse to the courts”; Kate Glover, “Structural
Cooperative Federalism” (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 45-66, at 47, 53 (cooperative federalism as a legal
or interpretative principle); and Eric M. Adams, “Judging the Limits of Cooperative Federalism”
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 27-43, at 30 (cooperative federalism as a constitutional metaphor).
17
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”].
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law could regulate the location of aerodromes within a province.18 In
finding the provincial law to be constitutionally inapplicable, McLachlin
C.J.C. for the majority held that the focus of the impairment inquiry
“must be on the power itself”;19 that is, on “whether the core of the
legislative power has been impaired, not whether or how Parliament has,
in fact chosen to exercise that power.”20 Put another way, as McLachlin
C.J.C. noted, the issue is whether the impugned law would result “in an
unacceptable narrowing of Parliament’s legislative options.”21 By
focusing on the legislative power, rather than the impact of the provincial
law on particular federal activities, McLachlin C.J.C. emphasized that
impairment is primarily a legal test — one that examines a law’s impact
on the legislative powers of the other level of government — and not
primarily a factual or evidentiary test.
This focus of the impairment analysis has significant legal and
practical implications for the stability of the division of powers and legal
certainty. If the focus is the particular evidence before a given court, then
the same legislation could be constitutionally applicable one day, based
on a particular factual record, but inapplicable another day, based on
different evidence. This is exactly the concern identified 30 years ago in
Bell Canada, where Beetz J. remarked that “I think it is clear that the
courts could not be asked to decide on a case by case basis at what point
there is impairment.”22
Stability and legal certainty were also promoted in PHS Community
Services Society — the Insite safe injection clinic case — which
confirmed that interjurisdictional immunity is reciprocal and can be
invoked by either level of government. In this instance, however,
McLachlin C.J.C. resisted a province’s call to exempt this health clinic
from federal criminal laws relating to controlled substances.23 While the
case was ultimately decided under section 7 of the Charter, the Court also
considered whether the federal measures impaired the core of the
18

Lacombe, above, note 1; COPA, above, note 1.
COPA, supra, note 1, at para. 48.
20
Id., at para. 52 (emphasis in original).
21
Lacombe, supra, note 1, at para. 66.
22
Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec),
[1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749, at 864 (S.C.C.). See, however, the later decision of
Rogers Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay (City), [2016] S.C.J. No. 23, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 467, at
para. 71 (S.C.C.) (Wagner and Côté JJ. for the majority), at para. 121 (Gascon J. concurring in the
result), where the Court appears to have placed greater emphasis on evidence of the actual impact of
an impugned provincial law on a federal telecommunications undertaking and its activities than on
the impact on Parliament’s exclusive legislative power to regulate telecommunications.
23
PHS Community Services Society, supra, note 1.
19
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provincial power over health care — an argument that had been accepted
by a majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal. Chief Justice
McLachlin rejected this view, instead urging a cautious, limited recourse
to interjurisdictional immunity. While she recognized that the doctrine
had recently fallen out of favour, she underscored that “[p]redictability,
important to the proper functioning of the division of powers, requires
recognition of previously established cores of power.”24 But McLachlin
C.J.C. noted that as the courts had never identified a core of the “broad
and extensive” provincial health power — which “extends to thousands
of activities and to a host of different venues” — she reasoned that such a
“vast core” would “sit ill with the restrained application of the doctrine
called for by the jurisprudence.”25 Preventing criminal law from applying
to provincial health care facilities would, McLachlin C.J.C. concluded,
“disturb settled competencies and introduce uncertainties for new ones.”26
Insite will likely remain an important division of powers case because
it was the first time a province had invoked interjurisdictional immunity
against a federal law27 — which perhaps also underscores how
asymmetrical the doctrine had become.28 Chief Justice McLachlin
seemed willing to apply the doctrine in a province’s favour in an
appropriate case, despite the absence of precedent. And, even though
some viewed the doctrine as largely moribund after Canadian Western
Bank, Insite underscores that it will inevitably survive, albeit restrained
in application.
Lastly, the Chief Justice’s ground-breaking reasons in Tsilhqot’in
clarified the relationship between interjurisdictional immunity and
Aboriginal rights protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982.29 The Court held that federal or provincial attempts to regulate
lands held under Aboriginal title must not be evaluated under
interjurisdictional immunity, but rather, under the Sparrow justification
framework in section 35.30 This issue arose because interjurisdictional
immunity and section 35 provide incompatible ways for evaluating
legislative infringements of Aboriginal rights. Interjurisdictional immunity
24

Id., at para. 65.
Id., at para. 68.
Id., at para. 70.
27
See Hogg, supra, note 16, at 15-38.7.
28
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 17, at para. 35.
29
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
30
R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.). The Sparrow test
asks whether the infringement is reasonable, imposes an undue hardship, and denies the holders of
the right their preferred means of exercising the right.
25
26
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assumes that an Aboriginal right is at the core of federal jurisdiction
over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”,31 and then renders
inapplicable any legislative encroachment, however reasonable or
justified it might otherwise be. In contrast, the Sparrow framework
focuses on the reasonableness of the legislative encroachment. The
result, McLachlin C.J.C. noted, is “dueling tests directed at answering
the same question: how far can provincial governments go in regulating
the exercise of s. 35 Aboriginal rights?”32 Chief Justice McLachlin
solved this conundrum by clarifying that, like rights guaranteed under the
Charter, Aboriginal rights protected under section 35 are “held against
government — they operate to prohibit certain types of regulation which
government could otherwise impose.” As she explained, “[t]hese limits
have nothing to do with whether something lies at the core of the federal
government’s powers.”33
In short, Tsilhqot’in established, for the first time, that the
interjurisdictional immunity paradigm simply does not apply where
section 35 rights are at issue. By affirming the role of the Sparrow test,
the result, McLachlin C.J.C. noted, is “to protect Aboriginal and treaty
rights while also allowing the reconciliation of Aboriginal interests with
those of the broader society”.34
Thus, in each of these three very different rulings, Chief Justice
McLachlin’s reasons brought greater stability, certainty, and clarity to the
doctrines of legal federalism.

IV. CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGAL EDUCATION
While Chief Justice McLachlin made many important contributions to
division of powers doctrines, it may be that her most important and
durable one in this realm has been to legal education — by teaching this
important area of Canadian law to the innumerable readers of her
decisions, whether they be law students, lawyers, judges or members of
the public. The Chief Justice is rightly revered as an exceptional jurist in
part because of the clarity of her writing and her ability to expose
complex ideas in accessible terms. She is well-known for distilling
tangled areas of the law in a few paragraphs, leaving for posterity a
31
Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 3, s. 91(24), cited in Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 1, at
paras. 103 and 129.
32
Tsilhqot’in, id., at para. 146.
33
Id., at para. 142 (emphasis in original).
34
Id., at paras. 138-139.
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succinct guide for traversing a thicket of often inconsistent cases. Her
reasons can be counted on to bring coherence and order to the law. Her
students — and we are all her students — always leave with a clearer and
more principled understanding of the law.
Undoubtedly, the rigour and clarity of Chief Justice McLachlin’s
judicial writing have contributed significantly to legal education in
Canada.

V. CONCLUSION
Inevitably these brief remarks have only scratched the surface of
Chief Justice McLachlin’s many contributions to the division of powers.
These include her non-partisan and impartial judicial philosophy, her
substantive clarifications to the doctrines of legal federalism, and her
important and lasting contributions to Canadian legal education. A deep
store of learning and thinking resides in this part of her work, a rich
jurisprudence that will continue to provide guidance in this important
field of Canadian constitutional law.

